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NERVOUS LAUGHTER AND THE HIGH COST OF 
EQUALITY: 
RENEWING "NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND" WILL 
SAFEGUARD A VIBRANT FEDERALISM AND A PATH 
TOWARD EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Presidential candidates called it "unconstitutional," an 
"unfunded mandate." ' Its fiercest critics charge its intent is to 
undermine and dismantle public education itself.2 National 
Public Radio betrayed a grievous misunderstanding when it 
erroneously described a thoughtful proposal in Congress to 
provide tax credits to non-participating states as a radical 
1. Tom Tancredo called No Child Left Behind "intrusive" and "unconstitutional." 
Election '08: Talk with the Candidates, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11, 2007, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost .com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2007/10/0l/DI2007100101446.html. Bill Richardson and Hillary 
Clinton both called the la w an "unfunded manda te." Transcript, Hillary Clinton's 
Caucus Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/us/politics/03clinton-transcript.html? 
pagewanted=print ("And if you are worried about once and for all taking on global 
warming, making it clear that we will end the unfunded mandate known as No Child 
Left Behind, that we will make college affordable again, that we will be once again the 
country of values and ideals that we cherish so much , then, please, join me in this 
campaign.") ; Bill Richardson, Op-Ed., N CLB Fails Our Schools , USA TODAY, Sep. 7, 
2007, at lOA ("We need to move beyond the empty rhetoric of No Child Left Behind .... 
True education r eform requires more than a set of unfunded mandates and a list of 
failing schools. It requires a vision for success [and] the state and federal funding to 
match .... ") . On the term "unfunded mandate," see infra. note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
2. See Gerald W. Bracey, Believing the Worst , STAN. MAG., July-Aug. 2006, 
available at http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2006/julaug/features/nclb. 
html ("NCLB aims to shrink the public sector, transfer large sums of public money to 
the priva te sector, weaken or destroy two Democratic power bases-the teachers 
unions- and provide vouchers to Jet students attend private schools at public 
expense."); Alfie Kohn, NCLB and the Effort To Privatize Public Education, in MANY 
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: HOW THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT IS DAMAGING OUR 
CHILDREN AND OUR SCHOOLS 79, 96 (Deborah Meier & George Wood eds., 2004) 
(arguing that NCLB, by both design and effect, puts the United States "at risk of 
a bandoning public education altogether"). 
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proposal to allow states not to participate. 3 Yet the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) is hardly the subversive, far-
reaching, and peremptory law that these misconceptions and 
attacks suggest.4 Rather, NCLB is divisive because it has 
raised penetrating questions with profound implications for the 
future . NCLB is a major example of a federal initiative to 
respond to a well documented nationwide need, and its success 
or failure will influence future solutions to stubborn national 
problems ranging from health care to oversight of the financial 
industries. As Congress considers the renewal of NCLB, it has 
a moral and political imperative to get it right. 
The greatest support for NCLB continues to come from 
states, communities, organizations, and families who are 
sensitive to its central mission: improving the academic 
achievement and educational opportunities in the poorest-
performing schools to match more closely those in high-
performing schools. 5 When it was enacted, NCLB enjoyed 
3. Compare Claudio Sanchez, 'No Child' Law Picked Apart as Renewal Fight 
Looms, MORNING EDITION, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyld=18432881 ("[Representative Scott Garrett of New Jersey] 
wants to give states the right to opt out of the law. It's an idea that several governors 
support, but Congress is unlikely to seriously consider."), with Press Release, Scott 
Garrett, Garrett Promotes Overhaul of Education Policy as No Child Left Behind Hits 
6 Year Anniversary (Jan. 7, 2008), available at 
http://garrett.house .gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx? 
DocumentiD=81394 ("My bill allows residents of the states that opt out of NCLB to 
receive a tax credit equal to the amount that they would have otherwise received in 
federal funding. So schools won't be penalized with a loss of funding if they choose to 
exercise control over their own education destiny."). 
4. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-
7941). 
5. Stephen L. Carter credits NCLB for narrowing the racial gap in test scores. 
See Op-Ed. , Affirmative Distraction, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008 (Week in Review), at 10. 
The Connecticut State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) intervened in Connecticut v. Spellings to defend NCLB. 549 F. 
Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Conn. 2008) (misidentifying NAACP as a plaintiff-intervenor 
rather than defendant-intervenor); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Second Mot. to Intervene 
on Behalf of NAACP at 1 (No. 3:05CV1330), 2006 WL 4738705. 
Coalitions of civil rights organizations and parents have sued (unsuccessfully) to 
enforce NCLB's provisions, including those requiring notification to parents that their 
children attend deficient schools and are eligible for supplemental educational services 
(free tutoring), Newark Parents Ass'n v. N ewark Pub. Sch., 547 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008); 
those requiring highly qualified teachers in every classroom, Renee v. Spellings, No. 
C 07-4299 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2008), 2008 WL 2468481; and those granting students in 
failing schools the right to transfer to another school in the distr ict, Ass'n of Cmty. 
Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
For an example of educators' discussion of positive results from NCLB, see Betsy 
Hammond, No Child Left Behind Changes Oregon Education, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, 
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broad bipartisan support and recognition of its central, civil 
rights objectives.6 Much of the public has grown disenchanted, 
however-"educators, legislators, and even entire states are in 
open revolt over NCLB"7-and liberal education scholars talk 
of "laudable goals" and "noble agenda" overrun by inherent 
flaws and "unintended consequences."8 
Where a sound and laudable premise meets flawed design 
and unintended consequences, however, revolt and 
abandonment are not the normal nor the best response. The 
countless parodies and puns the name No Child Left Behind 
has inspired in the press and elsewhere suggest something 
more than a logical reaction is going on. 9 The protests against 
NCLB are suffused with nervous laughter, which signals 
unacknowledged interests and responsibilities. Granted, NCLB 
has serious structural weaknesses and presents considerable-
perhaps unduly burdensome-political and financial challenges 
for the states; but its central mission and virtues remain 
unchanged. 
There are two elemental objections to NCLB. Although they 
are inextricably related, the first objection expresses a policy 
Aug. 31, 2008, at Al. 
6. See Linda Darling-Hammond, From "Separate but Equal" to "No Child Left 
Behind'~· The Collision of New Standards and Old Inequalities, in MANY CHILDREN 
LEFT BEHIND, supra note 2, at 3, 3; George Wood, Introduction to MANY CHILDREN 
LEFT BEHIND, supra note 2, at vii , viii-ix. 
For fuller accounts of the complex motives behind NCLB, see PATRICK J . MCGUINN, No 
CH ILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-
2005 165-94 (2006); Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a 
Congressional Compromise, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE 
OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). 
7. Wood, supra note 6, at x. Most recently, the Virginia legislature voted nearly 
unanimously to study the feasibility of opting out of NCLB. See Jeff Mellott, Bills To 
Pull Virginia Out of No Child Left Behind Move Through Committees, DAILY NEWS-
REG. (Harrisonburg, Va.), Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.dnronline.com/details. 
php'?AID=1478l&CHID=2; Jeff Mellott, NCLB Contingency Bill Passes House, DAILY 
NEWS-RF.C . (Harrisonburg, Va.), Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://www.dnronline.com/ 
news_details. php?AID=14793&CHID=2; Editorial, Virginia Left Behind, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 6, 2008, at A20. 
A 2008 Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup poll helps to keep the disenchantment with NCLB in 
perspective, however. The poll reported that 25 percent of Americans believed NCLB 
should be allowed to expire and 42 percent believed it should be changed significantly. 
William J. Bushaw & Alec M. Gallup, Americans Speak Out~Are Educators and Policy 
Makers Listening?, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2008, at 9-10, available at http://www. 
pdkmembers.org/members_online/publications/e-gallup/kpoll_pdfs/pdkpoll40_2008.pdf. 
8. Wood, supra note 6, at xi; Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 3, 4. 
9. Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 4 ("The proliferating nicknames emerging 
as this intrusive legislation plays out across the country give a sense of some of the 
anger, bewilderment, and confusion left in its wake."). 
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concern about education (what government should provide and 
require), while the second expresses a constitutional concern 
about federalism (how state and federal governments should 
function and within what limits of control). The two arguments 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. Complying with NCLB cripples states and schools with a 
sterile education policy obsessively focused on annual student 
testing and other superficial, shortsighted goals. 10 
2. While NCLB is in form a federal spending program, 
participation in the program is optional for states in theory 
only-the threat of withholding federal education funds from 
states that have long relied on them unconstitutionally 
coerces their participation in NCLB. Furthermore, because 
the federal funding is inadequate for full compliance with 
NCLB's requirements, the law unconstitutionally directs 
states' education policy. 1 1 
Both arguments sensibly address practical realities, and 
Congress should learn many essential points from them as it 
considers NCLB's future-especially as to the rigidity of 
NCLB's deadlines and benchmarks, the punitive nature of 
10. See, e.g., Darling-Hammond, supra note 6, at 9 ("The biggest problem with the 
NCLB Act is that it mistakes measuring schools for fixing them."); Frederick M. Hess , 
Refining or Retreating?: High-Stakes Accountability in the States, in No CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND?, supra note 6, at 55, 72 ("A tendency exists to recoil from the real costs of 
high-stakes accountability, thus producing a series of well-intentioned compromises 
that leave the fa9ade of accountability intact but strip its motive power."); Diane 
Ravitch, Op-Ed., Get Congress Out of the Classroom , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, a t A25 
(NCLB "has unleashed an unhealthy obsession with standardized testing"; its threat of 
sanctions provides "an incentive to show that schools and students are making steady 
progress, even if they are not"; and its goal of universal proficiency by the year 2014 "is 
simply unattainable"); see also Thomas Sobol, Discussion of NCLB's conceptual flaws in 
a speech at Columbia University, Nov. 5, 2003, quoted in Charles R. Lawrence III , Who 
Is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of the New School Reform, 39 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 699 (2006) ("Educating children is like nurturing a garden; things need to be 
tended steadily and slowly, and it doesn't help to pull them up by the roots and 
measure them too often."). 
11. See, e.g. , L. Darnell Weeden, Does the No Child Left Behind Law (NCLBA) 
Burden the States as an Unfunded Mandate Under Federal Law?, 31 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 239 (2006); Gina Austin, Note, Leaving Ji'ederalism Behind: How the No Child Left 
Behind Act Uwrps States' Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON 1. REV. 337 (2005); Michael D. 
Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole Frees States from the 
Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (2008); 
Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal To Prevent Federal 
Conditional Spending that Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. RF:V. 521 (2005); 
but see generally Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an 
Unfunded Mandate or a Promotion of Federal Educational ideals?, 37 ,J.L. & EDUC. 193 
(2008). 
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some of its sanctions, and its neglect of teaching methods. 12 
Nonetheless, these arguments tend toward a negative and 
counterproductive logic that limits their usefulness. They draw 
attention to what is missing (time, money, and creative and 
flexible teaching), but avoid frankly weighing the states' role in 
presiding over the accretion of unmet need. They present a 
contradiction by decrying excessive federal interference and 
insufficient federal funding. They do not point the way forward 
to correcting the long intractable problem of inequality in 
educational opportunities, but insist that the flexibility and 
freedom schools have enjoyed for decades is still the solution. 13 
The policy argument correctly maintains that the testing 
and data collection NCLB requires cannot effect meaningful 
reform without a concentrated focus on teaching and 
curriculum. But the implication that NCLB prevents true 
teaching r eform is a straw man, however grounded it may be in 
current fiscal realities . Contrarily, the policy argument more 
often than not incorrectly implies that meaningful education 
reform can proceed without a basic system of rigorous testing 
and solid data collection in place. 14 It also obscures the primary 
objective of equality behind NCLB's requirement that each 
state adopt uniform educational standards. A thorough system 
of assessment and accountability is the necessary basis alike of 
any sound education policy and of any equality measure. 
If NCLB is to succeed on its own terms, Congress will 
indeed have to partner with the states to support their 
development of programs for teaching and curriculum reform. 
By their nature, these programs require individualization and 
resist standardization. In the meantime, though, there is no 
12. NCLB's much discussed punitive sanctions ar e described with more 
equa nimity by Professor Wood when he says that the focus on achievement measures 
"ha [s] lead to a quanti tative standard of th e success or failure of school distr icts. " R. 
CRAIG WOOD. EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE 
AID PLANS- AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 77 (3d ed . 2007) . 
Perha ps a n even mor e important consideration obscured by crit icism is that the 
sa nctions on schools a re, from another perspective, remedies gua ranteed to students. 
13. For example, Professor Ravitch , supra note 10, argues that states and school 
districts, not Congress, have the "competence" "to fix the nation's schools." In the same 
context, Debora h Meier a rgues tha t "[t]he solu t ion to the messiness of democracy is 
more of it-and more t ime set aside to make it work." NCLB and Democracy, in MANY 
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND, sup r a note 2, a t 66, 72 . While the concept of institut ional 
competence may ha ve some relevance, these ar guments a re essentially arguments to 
main tain the status quo. 
14. In fact, it is argued that testing is posit ive ly detrimental to learning. See infra 
note 70. 
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convincing justification for denying the primacy of assessment 
and accountability. Those denials are, at worst, part of a 
uniquely American distaste for governmental discipline that 
has left us with financial, health care, energy and other 
industries profoundly neglectful of sustainability. 
NCLB's requirement of uniform standards across each state 
is a direct attack on the inequality inherent in our system of 
school financing from local property taxes . From the 
perspective of the Fourteenth Amendment and the perspective 
of anti-poverty measures, equalizing opportunities should take 
precedence over individual communities' pursuit of excellence. 
Connecticut's efforts to escape some of NCLB's requirements 
provide an especially instructive example of this problem. 
Connecticut lobbied and sued the Department of Education 
(DOE) (the agency charged with administering NCLB) for 
waivers to avoid supplementing its pre-NCLB tests that were 
nationally recognized for their excellence, even while 
Connecticut was recognized as the state with the single biggest 
discrepancy in academic achievement between its high and low 
performing students.15 Connecticut is the only state that has 
lodged a full constitutional attack on NCLB in court. 
Congress should remain committed to uniform standards 
across each state, but the Bush administration's refusal to 
engage in any substantive negotiation with states requesting 
waivers of certain provisions of NCLB sent a chilling message 
that was counterproductive to NCLB's goals. 16 In renewing 
NCLB, therefore, Congress should pay particular attention to 
the DOE's discretionary powers in administering the program. 
The federalism argument summarized above also has merit, 
especially in its perception that opting out of NCLB would 
amount to a politically disastrous forfeit of federal aid that 
could not be recaptured through other means, such as raising 
state taxes. There may ultimately be no satisfying answer for 
this problem-it may simply be a fiscal reality of the modern 
federal relationship and a function of the federal government's 
15. For discussion, see Michael J. Pendell , How Far Is Too Far?: The Spending 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Education State's Battle Against Unfunded 
Mandates, 71 ALB. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (2008). 
16. See Second Am. Compl. , a t n 104- 06, 114, 117-26, 133- 36, 14.'3-59, 
Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F . Supp. 2d 161 (D. Conn. 2008) (No. 3:05CV1 330), 2005 
WL 4748348 [hereinafter Connecticut Complaint]; but see Rudalevige, supra note 6, at 
46 (discussing a few areas rela ted to test design and highly qualified teachers in which 
the Bush administration allowed states flexibility in implementing NCLB). 
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responsibility for equality measures under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 17 
Yet, the federalism argument obscures a fact of 
fundamental importance: NCLB does not determine a 
participating state's education standards; it merely requires 
the state to adopt standards of its choosing that are adequate 
and to document the uniform application of those standards. 18 
If the states' ability to opt out of NCLB is largely 
impractical and simply a formalism, the federalism argument 
is as much a rhetorical stance that puts Congress on the 
defensive as it is a demonstration of NCLB's coercive effects. It 
is telling that no state has opted out of NCLB since its 
inception seven years ago. 19 Connecticut's constitutional 
challenge to NCLB was dismissed as premature, since the DOE 
had taken no enforcement actions or final decisions against 
Connecticut.20 Since it has not withdrawn from NCLB or 
17. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; "The Congress shall have power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," id. § 5. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was the inspiration, rather than the constitutional basis, 
for the civil rights legislation of the 1960s from which NCLB descends. See infra Part 
II .A. 
18. The possibility of promoting national standards and assessments was rejected 
during the years of discussion and drafting leading up to NCLB. See MCGUINN, supra 
note 6, at 130-34. Professor Ravitch, supra note 10, suggests that national testing 
would remove the incentive states have to manipulate their collection of data, but this 
solution will be even less palatable to NCLB's detractors who are concerned with 
states' autonomy. 
Commentators frequently foster the misperception that NCLB imposes national 
standards through careless argumentation and/or sentence structure, as in the 
following example: "NCLB now determines what constitutes a failing school and what 
should be done about it." Kenneth Wong & Gail Sunderman, Education Accountability 
as a Presidential Priority: No Child Left Behind and the Bush Presidency, 37 PUBLIUS 
333, 334 (2007). Later in the article, the same writers distinguish more accurately 
between "[t]he emergence of federally led accountability policy'' and the "decision-
making process" of state education agencies and local school districts that under NCLB 
"implement(s] the law's provisions" and "shap[es] their education reform agendas." Id. 
at 341. 
19. At least three school districts in Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont refused 
funding, although "none had much money at stake." Amanda Ripley, Inside the Revolt 
over Bush's School Rules: The Reddest of All States Is Leading the Charge Against No 
Child Left Behind, TIME MAG., May 9, 2005, at 30; see also Ulrich Boser, A New Law Is 
Put to the Test , U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 2004 (reporting that Somers School 
District in Connecticut refused "some $45,000 in No Child Left Behind money," "only a 
small fra ction of the [district's] $15 million annual budget"). 
At least one state has lost Title I funding as a penalty under NCLB: Georgia lost 
$783,000 in 2003 for delaying implementation of tests required by IASA. Rudalevige, 
supra note 6, at 46. On IASA, see infra note 42 and accompanying text). 
20. Conn. v. Spellings (Connecticut I), 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 491-94 (D. Conn. 
2006). 
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refused to comply with any of its provisions, it may be said that 
Connecticut has not put its money where its mouth was. The 
other constitutional challenge to NCLB, School District of 
Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of 
Education, was not joined or supported by any of the states in 
which the plaintiff school districts reside; furthermore, Pontiac 
principally alleges lack of notice rather than the fatal 
constitutional defect of coercion.21 
Part II of this comment introduces the background of 
federal education policy and considers NCLB's requirements 
and costs in light of the states' constitutional prerogative under 
the Tenth Amendment to control education. Part III sets forth 
in detail the constitutional basis for federal education law in 
the Spending Clause and considers whether the unfunded 
spending NCLB requires of states is within the scope of 
Congress's power. 
II. NCLB AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE IN EDUCATION 
A. The Federal Role in Education 
1. History 
The United States Constitution makes no provisiOn for 
education. Since the Tenth Amendment reserves all 
unenumerated powers for state government, the federal 
government has no direct control over education.22 Early on, 
the federal government provided a small amount of funding for 
school construction, vocational and higher education, and some 
specialized programs like school lunch and impact aid; in 1958, 
it first provided some funding for academic instruction in 
21. See 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 12121 (May 1, 2008) (No. 05-2708). The case was reargued before the Sixth 
Circuit en bane on December 10, 2008. Editorial, No Money, No Child: We Can't Afford 
Education Reform on the Cheap, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 2008, at B6; Mark 
Walsh, Full 6th Circuit Weighs NEA Suit Against NCLB, EDUC. WK., Dec. 10, 2008, 
available at http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2008/12/full_6th_circuit_ 
weighs_nea_su.html. The parties filed supplemental briefs in Feb. 2009. As of this 
writing (January 2009), the court has not issued its decision. 
22. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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regular primary and secondary schools.23 Federal funding of 
education began in earnest with the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), a product of the civil 
rights and antipoverty agendas of the 1960s.24 The 
overwhelming majority of ESEA funds were appropriated 
under Title I for raising education spending for disadvantaged 
students.25 Although not an unconditional grant like most 
earlier federal education spending, the intended uses of Title I 
funds were loosely specified.26 
Funding is not the only role the federal government has in 
education. The federal judiciary frequently supervised the 
desegregation of schools after 1954, when the Supreme Court 
held in Brown v. Board of Education that, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, an opportunity for education, if 
provided by a state, was "a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms."27 In 1973, in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court declined to extend that 
holding to strike down longstanding school financing laws 
whereby local property taxes largely supplement state and 
federal funding in local schools and whereby even state funding 
may be distributed unequally in favor of wealthier districts.28 
San Antonio held that there is no fundamental federal right to 
an education29 or, if there is, then not to a particular quality of 
education beyond a minimally adequate one.30 Therefore, even 
greatly unequal local school financing is constitutionally 
23. See McGUINN, supra note 6, at 25-28. 
24. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as a mended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 
6301-794 1); see generally MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 25, 28--39. 
25. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 32 ("[ESEA] did not provide general federal 
aid to public schools. Instead, ESEA provided 'categorical' aid that was targeted to a 
specific student population: disadvantaged students."). 
26. See id. at 33-35. 
27. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In the three years between 1967 and 1970, the discrepancy 
between Texas's funding of Edgewood and Alamo Heights increased from $3 per pupil 
to $135 per pupil, partly because state funding levels were tied to school spending on 
teaching salaries. See id. at 12-13, 13 n .35; id. at 79-81, 79 n.31 (Marshall, J. , 
dissenting). 
29. ld. at 37 (majority opinion) ("We have carefully considered each of the 
arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental 
right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive."). 
30. See id. at 36--37 ("Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of 
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of 
either [First Amendment rights or the right to vote], we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls 
short."). 
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permissible. 31 
2. Federal enforcement of equality and (under NCLB) of 
adequacy 
[2009 
San Antonio thus put an end to the "first wave" of school 
financing litigation that sought a federal remedy for unequal 
education opportunities.32 Its holding has never been revisited 
and most likely never will be. 33 
An enduring implication of San Antonio's holding is the 
idea that education, despite its great importance to our system 
of values, 34 is more like police, health, and other social services 
rendered by state and local governments than it is a 
fundamental and generative human right like voting. 35 San 
Antonio rejected the view that education is generative of 
freedom, that is, it rejected the argument that education "is 
essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote."36 The Court 
remarked: "[W]e have never presumed to possess either the 
31. See id. at 46 (local funding "may far exceed even the total [state basic 
education funding] grant"). 
32. See generally WOOD, supra note 12, at 53- 64; Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. 
Green, III, No Child Left Behind Act, Race, and Parents In volved, 5 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 271 , 289- 94 (2008). 
3'3. But see Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right To Learn: The 
Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case Out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 772 
(2008) ("[M]odern advocates pursuing a federal right to education can arguably 
overcome Rodriguez . .. . Rodriguez and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
preserved the possibility of a federal right to an education."); WOOD, supra note 12, at 
64 (although "any reversal" of San Antonio's holding that education is not a 
fundamental right "is not likely to occur lightly," nevertheless "it is clear the Supreme 
Court holds an undefined interest in education that may eventually emerge"). 
34. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 29-30. 
35. See id. at 54 ("[l]f local taxation for local expenditures were an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally 
impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed 
largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no 
justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been wit hin the 
constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing 
public services merely because the burden or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending 
upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live."); id. at 30 
("[T]he importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental."). 
The right to vote is accorded special protection as "a fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
36. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 35. 
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ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice .... 
[These] are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion 
into otherwise legitimate state activities."37 
The San Antonio Court tempered its holding by stressing 
the imperfections of the traditional school financing structure 
and by urging a political fix: 
[T]his Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its 
judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent 
for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long 
and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly 
innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and 
its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of 
quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters 
merit the continued attention of the scholars who already 
have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate 
solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the 
democratic pressures of those who elect them.38 
A second and third wave of school financing litigation in 
state courts took up the Court's challenge.39 The federal 
government expanded its funding and oversight of education in 
the decades following San Antonio,40 spurred in part by the 
reception of the dire 1983 report on education commissioned by 
President Reagan, A Nation at Risk.41 Most notably, it required 
academic achievement standards for all students and tied 
ESEA's Title I funding of disadvantaged students to those 
standards in 1994.42 
But it was only with the enactment of NCLB that the 
federal government took up where San Antonio left off and 
claimed a truly aggressive and innovative role for itself in 
reforming education inequalities. NCLB was enacted as the 
latest reauthorization and amendment of ESEA and was the 
37. ld. at 36. 
38. ld. at 5&--59. 
39. See generally WOOD, supra note 12, at 65-77; Oluwole & Green, supra note 
32, at 291-94. 
40. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 51-104; Umpstead , supra note 11, at 197- 98. 
41. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE 
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/ 
title. html. 
42. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994 (Goals 2000), Pub. L. No. 103-
227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); 
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 (IASA), Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. C.). 
376 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
first to dispense with ESEA's flexibility and to give its goals 
real teeth. NCLB is best understood as civil rights legislation 
that, under contemporary pressures on the federal government, 
introduced unprecedented vigor in binding states to achieve the 
goals of the 1965 law.43 In the pressure that it places on states, 
it is an attack on the stranglehold over education of the local 
property tax system of school financing. 44 NCLB thus 
counteracts San Antonio's tolerance of inequality and is clearly 
motivated by the concept of equal protection of the laws 
announced in the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Although critics 
have cried foul against the stringent new conditions NCLB 
placed on the continuation of longstanding Title I funding that 
states relied on,46 NCLB's goals are unchanged from ESEA's.47 
Moreover, much of NCLB's framework of uniform academic 
standards and accountability was put into law in 1994.48 NCLB 
simply stepped up the urgency and the stakes of these goals.49 
43. See MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 169-172. 
44. For an overview of current school district funding inequalities analyzed by 
concentration of minority population, see Oluwole & Green, supra note :32, at 287-88. 
There may be renewed efforts to change the local property tax system of school 
financing on the horizon. In 2006, the National Center on Education and the Economy 
released a report by the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce, 
Tough Choices or Tough Times, which includes a "proposal to abandon local funding of 
schools in favor of state funding using a uniform pupil-weighting funding formula." See 
Executive Summary at 17, available at http://skillscommission.org/executive.htm. The 
report has been embraced by New Hampshire's education commissioner, and parts of 
its recommendations are being implemented in three states. See Linda Jacobson, Pilot 
Projects To Aim at Workforce Issues, EDUC. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Nov. 5, 2008, at 13; 
Cindy Kibbe, N.H. Plays Key Role in Education Overhaul Report, N.H. Bus. R~:v., Nov. 
21, 2008, at 35. 
45. It has been suggested that under current Fourteenth Amendment law, as 
applied to education in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007), even race-conscious implementation of NCLB would survive judicial 
review. Oluwole & Green, supra note 32, at 296-305. 
46. See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 267 
n.4 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacated on other grounds); Bump, supra note 11, at 548, 551; see 
also Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~ 67. 
47. But see MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 193 (seeing NCLB's focus on accountability 
as "fundamentally chang[ing]" ESEA's goals and "creat[ing] a new [federal education] 
policy regime"). 
48. Rudalevige, supra note 6, at 27. 
49. Cf. MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 182 ("In essence, Goals 2000 encouraged states 
to create standards, testing, and accountability systems but NCLB requires it .... "). 
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B. NCLB's Requirements 
1. Statutory provisions 
NCLB requires states to adopt "challenging" and specific 
academic content standards in language arts, mathematics, 
and science and to align these with achievement standards for 
basic, proficient, and advanced levels.50 These standards must 
be embodied in student assessments given annually in grades 3 
through 8 and once in high school.51 Most importantly, the 
standards and assessments must be uniform throughout the 
state. 52 States are required to develop an accountability system 
that defines "adequate yearly progress" (AYP) and the methods 
for calculating it, together with a timeline to track annual 
progress toward NCLB's end goal of proficiency for all students 
in 2014. 53 States must submit initial, detailed compliance plans 
to the DOE.54 The Secretary of Education has approval power 
over the compliance plans but is also required to utilize the 
assistance of a peer review process that includes parents, 
teachers, and state education officials. 55 School districts and 
states are then required to publish annual reports of data, 
broken down to permit tracking of student performance by 
economic, racial, and other indicators.56 A number of remedies 
and sanctions are provided for schools that fail to meet A YP for 
any two consecutive years, ranging from offering students 
supplemental educational services (free tutoring) and school 
transfer privileges to closing and restructuring schools.57 
Finally, NCLB requires "highly qualified teachers" in every 
classroom.58 This is an overview of NCLB's most salient 
requirements. 
To demonstrate NCLB's lack of interest in dictating 
particular standards for states to adopt, the section of the law 
that defines "challenging academic standards" for the states' 
purpose of writing the content and achievement standards for 
50. 20 U.S.C. § 631l(b)(l) (2006). 
51. !d.§ 63ll(b)(3). 
52. ld. §§ 6311(b)( l)(B), (b)(2)(C)(i), (b)(3)(C)(i). 
53. !d. § 6311(b)(2). 
54. !d . § 6311(a). 
55. ld . § 63ll(e). 
56. Id. §§ 6311(h), 63 16(a) . 
57. !d. § 6316(b)-(f) . 
58. ld. §§ 6314(b)(l)(C), 6315(c)(l)(E). 
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the three core content areas is reproduced here in full: 
(D) CHALLENGING ACADEMIC STANDARDS.-Standards 
under this paragraph shall include-
(i) challenging academic content standards in academic 
subjects that-
(I) specify what children are expected to know and 
be able to do; 
(II) contain coherent and rigorous content; and 
(III) encourage the teaching of advanced skills; and 
(ii) challenging student academic achievement standards 
that-
(I) are aligned with the State's academic content 
standards; 
(II) describe two levels of high achievement 
(proficient and advanced) that determine how well 
children are mastering the material in the State 
academic content standards; and 
(III) describe a third level of achievement (basic) to 
provide complete information about the progress 
of the lower-achieving children toward mastering 
the proficient and advanced levels of 
achievement. 59 
The requirements here concern administrative specificity 
and informational transparency, not any particular level of 
academic mastery, as the subjective descriptors "coherent," 
"rigorous," and "advanced" indicate. Similarly, the section of 
the law that sets forth the parameters for defining A YP 
concerns the state's demonstration of "valid and reliable" 
statistics, "continuous and substantial academic improvement 
for all students" and for specific subgroups of disadvantaged 
students, and high school graduation rates; it does not suggest 
any particular level or rate of progress.60 NCLB expressly 
denies the Secretary of Education "the authority to require a 
State, as a condition of approval of the State plan, to include in, 
or delete from, such plan one or more specific elements of the 
59. ld. § 63ll(b)(l)(D). 
60. Id. § 63ll(b)(2)(C). 
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State's academic content standards or to use specific academic 
assessment instruments or items."61 
2. Is NCLB a substitute for excellence, or a basis? 
While it is true that NCLB's emphasis on annual testing, 
elaboration of standards, and collection and dissemination of 
data are unable to effect real academic improvement without a 
more profound reform of curriculum, teaching methods, and 
teacher preparation, it is equally true that education cannot be 
significantly improved without a solid foundation of 
assessment, accountability, and tracking, such as NCLB 
requires . This is especially true for low-performing schools, 
regardless of immediate negative impacts on passing rates and 
missed A YP. 62 
In fact, educators have long concentrated their efforts on 
curriculum and teaching methods, but without concrete and 
rigorous systems of assessment and accountability in place, 
those efforts have made little, if any, lasting impact and have 
often changed with the winds and little other reason.63 Such 
efforts have frequently focused on engaging and nurturing 
students while overlooking and neglecting their actual 
academic achievement.64 
61. Id. § 63ll(e)(1)(F). 
62. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Under "No Child" Law, Even Solid Schools Falter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A1 ; David J. Hoff, More Schools Facing Sanctions Under 
NCLB, Eouc. WK. , Dec. 19, 2008. 
63. Twenty-five years after its publication, what is most remarkable about A 
Nation at Risk is that it springs to commentators' minds less because of an anniversary 
than because the realities it described have changed so little (and worsened, if 
anything). Chief among those realities is our internationally "disproportionate share of 
low-performing students." Edward B. Fiske, Op-Ed., A Nation at a Loss, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2008, at A27. 
64. Howard Gardner's intuitive theory of multiple intelligences has been 
enthusiastically embraced by educators for many years , but it leads many teachers to 
neglect-without feeling they have done a disservice to their students-the academic 
skills like reading and mathematics that are by far the most indispensable and the 
most difficult to attain. Not so very far from this practice is an educational approach 
that stresses inspirational curricula and social services over academic skills. Prominent 
voices with the best intentions have called for just such an approach as a replacement 
for NCLB and an antidote to the difficulties it has created. See Lawrence, supra note 
10, at 716-18; Sam Dillon, New Vision for Schools Proposes Broad Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2008, at All (detailing Randi Weingarten's acceptance speech for her 
nomination to the presidency of the American Federation of Teachers). This approach 
is correct in its recognition that the consequences of entrenched racism and poverty 
obstruct academic achievement--even seemingly fatally. But it is misguided in its 
assumption that the worse evils must be eradicated first. The ultimate solution simply 
cannot be an either-or proposition or a first-second priority. Good teachers have always 
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NCLB's transparency and reporting requirements, however 
burdensome they may be, are appropriate and necessary in an 
open society. Students' and parents' educational choices depend 
on accurate information,65 and so does the civic purpose of our 
federation of states. NCLB puts academic achievement and 
accountability first because they are the cornerstone of any 
sound education policy. Objections to the high priority NCLB 
gives them are misconceived. 
Critics complain that NCLB's provisions for free tutoring 
and transfer privileges are ineffective because "only about 1 
percent of eligible students take advantage of switching schools 
and fewer than 20 percent of eligibles receive extra tutoring."66 
The complaint does not seem valid when the depth of the 
problem and the incipiency of the remedy are taken into 
account. Similarly, concerns that NCLB's tough requirements 
lead to the "perverse" results of lowered academic standards 
and lower graduation rates for the least privileged students are 
well founded , as is recognition of the obstacles to placing 
"highly qualified teachers" in every classroom.67 Nevertheless, 
it is fair to assume that the transparent reporting instituted by 
NCLB can lead, over time, to a correction of these problems. 
NCLB, like any project to change cultural norms, requires a 
suspension of our demand for decisive results in the short term. 
3. Is NCLB an intrusion on state policy or a spur? 
Complaints that NCLB directs state education policy are 
inaccurate.68 Particularly misleading is any implication that 
NCLB imposes standards on states. In fact, NCLB requires 
states to develop their own standards, design their own student 
inspired their students by nurturing th eir multiplici ty of learning styles and their 
apprehension of their social, physical, a nd psychological welfare. But teachers who 
refuse to acknowledge the primary importance of students' achievement in reading and 
mathematics often leave their students with as little of those resources as they found 
them. For a n eloquent exposition of what is at stake in NCLB's focus on core academic 
skills and the stark feelings that result, see Sam Dillon , Schools Cut Back S ubjects To 
Push Reading and Math , N.Y. TIMES, Ma r . 26, 2006, at All. 
65. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301(1), (12); 6311(a)(l); 6311(b)(3)(C)(xii) , (xv); 6311(c)(14); 
6311(d); cf. WOOD, supra note 12, at 78 (discussing access to information as relevant to 
enforcing r ights to an adequ ate education) . 
66. Ravitch, supra note 10. 
67. See Darling-Ha mmond, supra note 6, at 4, 16, and genera lly. 
68. As noted earlier , this argument is inext ricably related to the coercion 
argu ment discussed in Par t III below. See, e.g. , Austin, supra note 11, at 365-68, cited 
with approval in Weeden, supra note 11, at 242-43. 
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assessments, define proficiency and AYP, and determine how 
quickly their AYP will approach the 2014 goal of 100 percent 
proficiency. 69 By reqmrmg states to develop statewide 
standards that implement a uniform education policy, NCLB 
works carefully with the constitutional imperatives. It respects 
state control of education (as the Tenth Amendment requires), 
and it preserves local governments' prerogative to supplement 
education funding (as San Antonio requires) and hence to 
enrich curriculum for local needs. Standards are, after all, only 
a base for teaching. 
The complaint that standardized testing forces teachers to 
"teach to the test" and to neglect a rich curriculum has entered 
the commonplace. 70 Research, it is argued, shows that "as a 
rule, better standardized exam results are more likely to go 
hand-in-hand with a shallow approach to learning than with 
deep understanding"; thus, "a rise in scores may be worse than 
meaningless: it may actually be reason for concern."71 But the 
assumption here-that preparing the most disadvantaged and 
struggling students to pass standardized tests saps all other 
time and energy for teaching and learning and precludes a rich 
curriculum fostering critical and imaginative thinking-is a 
fallacy. 72 The prevalence of the complaint against "teaching to 
the test" is better interpreted as evidence of the need for 
radical teaching and curriculum reform. 
There is thus no foundation to the idea that NCLB imposes 
education policy on states. Although the DOE has denied 
requests for waivers, there is no evidence that states have been 
penalized for submitting substandard plans or that the plans 
must meet some unwritten expectations of federal policy.73 The 
69. On the implications of states' choices to adopt a quicker or slower AYP, see 
Thomas J. Kane & Douglas 0. Staiger, Unintended Consequences of Racial Subgroup 
Rules, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 6, at 152, 154; Dillon, supra note 62; 
Hoff, supra note 62. 
70. See generally Alfie Kohn, Fighting the Tests: A Practical Guide to Rescuing 
Our Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Jan. 2001, at 348. 
71. Id. at 350. 
72. Kohn himself offers what he calls a "short-term response[]" that seems 
perfectly judicious: "First, if you are a teacher, you should do what is necessary to 
prepare students for the tests-and then get back to the rea/learning. Never forget the 
difference between these two objectives." Id. at 350-51. Kohn betrays his own prejudice 
here in his suggestion that performance on standardized tests is not evidence of "real 
learning." Nevertheless, his ensuing discussion establishes the practicality (and 
therefore the effectiveness) of his stated principle. See id. at 351. 
73. Cf. Rudalevige, supra note 6, at 46 (the Bush administration "signaled a 
hands-off stance on judging the quality of state standards and assessments."). 
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popular misconception allows opponents of the law to obscure 
their own role in opposing the adoption of state standards. 
That is not to say that frictions are avoidable or that NCLB 
presents no challenge to federalism. Nor is it to say the federal 
government can do no better than it has done in NCLB. But 
federal enforcement of equality is necessarily at times inimical 
to entrenched local interests, as the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including its application to education pursuant to 
Brown, has amply demonstrated. It is perhaps inevitable that 
the pursuit of equality in education manifest itself temporarily 
(again) as a struggle over institutional power and financial 
resources. ESEA, after all, "was intended to be primarily a 
redistributive bill."74 NCLB executes that intention and upsets 
the status quo of vastly unequal opportunities and outcomes in 
education. 
C. Costs and Funding Under NCLB 
1. Facts 
Congress's actual annual appropriations have never 
equaled the amounts authorized under NCLB; they have been 
between one-half and two-thirds of the amounts originally 
authorized. 75 Nevertheless, the appropriations represent a 
significant increase in federal funding of education-in the first 
year of the program, federal funding increased by 26 percent 
and, by 2005, the increases in federal funding that had resulted 
from NCLB accounted for about 2 percent of the total education 
spending by states, 76 a substantial increase, especially 
considering that federal funding of education constitutes only 
about 7 or 8 percent of total education spending.77 NCLB's 
74. MCGUINN, supra note 6, at 31. 
75. The relevant figures are published by the DOE, teachers' unions, governors' 
associations, and others. For synthesis and discussion, see Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y 
of the U.S. Dep 't of Educ. , 512 F.3d 252, 275-77 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacated on other 
grounds) (McKeague, J. , dissenting); Brief for the Governor of the Commonwealth of 
Pa. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, id., at 6- 11 (No. 05-2708), 2006 WL 
3837407; Oluwole & Green, supra note 32, at 295; and Umpstead, supra note 11, at 
201-2. 
76. See Umpstead, supra note 11, a t 201-02 (citing a 2005 report by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures); cf. Stan Karp, NCLB's Selective Vision of Equality: 
Some Gaps Count More than Others, in MANY CHILDREN LEIT BEHIND, supra note 2, at 
53, 64 (estimating 1 percent, without attribution). 
77. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 277 (McKeague, J., dissenting); Rudalevige, supra 
note 6, at 45; Umpstead, supra note 11, at 201; Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, 
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critics distort this reality with irresponsible exaggerations and 
inaccuracies, such as the following: "NCLB places, without 
remuneration, financially and bureaucratically onerous 
reporting duties on states, districts, and schools. By contrast, 
Title V of ESEA of the 89th Congress in 1965 added funds 
directly to assist state departments of education to carry out 
and extend the purposes of the Act."78 
Total federal appropriations under NCLB have covered only 
approximately one-third of some states' costs of compliance. 
Since the amounts originally authorized were only twice or less 
than twice the actual appropriations, it is clear that even the 
authorized amounts would have been insufficient to pay for 
compliance without the need for states to incur costs of their 
own. 79 Because states design their own assessments and 
determine their own rates of progress, each state controls the 
cost of its program, as the Connecticut example demonstrates. 
Before the enactment of NCLB, Connecticut Mastery Tests 
(CMTs) were given in grades 4, 6, and 8 and were nationally 
recognized as models of high quality, comprehensive testing.80 
To avoid the cost of developing new CMTs for grades 3, 5, and 
7, Connecticut requested a waiver of NCLB's annual 
summative testing requirement. 81 It proposed substituting 
much less expensive tests individualized by classroom and 
offered sound rationale for such an education policy.82 The 
Bush administration DOE denied the request and suggested 
that Connecticut use multiple choice tests in grades 3, 5, and 7 
to comply with NCLB's requirements while avoiding the great 
cost of developing and implementing new CMTs.83 Connecticut 
viewed this advice as both unsound education policy and 
The Politics and Practice of Accountability, in No CHILD LEFT BEHIND?, supra note 6, 
at 1, l. 
78. Theodore R. Sizer, Preamble: A Reminder for Americans, in MANY CHILDREN 
LEr'l' BEHIND, supra note 2, xvii, at xxii (emphasis added) . 
79. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 276-77 (McKeague, J., dissenting). On the question of 
whether costs associated with reaching proficiency by 2014 should be considered part of 
NCLB's compliance costs, see Umpstead, supra note 11, at 223- 27. It seems unhelpful 
to exclude these from calculations of NCLB's costs, but Umpstead's point that the 
actua l federal appropria tions have covered the narrower administrative costs of 
complying with NCLB is worth noting. 
80. Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~~ 1-2; see also Pendell, su.pra note 15, 
at 521-23; see generally Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 475-78. 
81. See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~~ 105, 112, 143. 
82. Id. ~~ 107-13. 
83. !d. ~~ 120, 137, 139, 153. 
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financially unworkable. 84 The DOE thus rejected Connecticut's 
policy preferences in favor of strict compliance with NCLB. 
Connecticut, for its part, proceeded to develop new CMTs for 
grades 3, 5, and 7. This sequence of events makes it clear that 
Connecticut took on the extra cost of developing CMTs as a 
policy choice, not as a requirement of NCLB or the DOE, and 
that reality serves to keep in perspective NCLB's true financial 
effects. 
2. NCLB's redistributive economic effects 
The direct costs of implementing NCLB, particularly the 
costs of developing and administering annual tests, are by all 
accounts high. The charge that funding is inadequate for 
compliance, though, again discounts the crucial factor of states' 
policy choices. It would be difficult to understand why the 
federal government should pay for Connecticut's choice to 
develop highly sophisticated tests when other states have 
adopted multiple choice tests to comply with NCLB. Such an 
outcome would mean that Connecticut's testing program would 
essentially be subsidized by the federal taxes collected from 
residents of other states that provide lesser (more basic) 
educational opportunities to their own residents than 
Connecticut provided to its residents. 85 That outcome would 
exacerbate rather than reduce pre-NCLB inequities. 
NCLB's reporting requirements and the remedies and 
sanctions it provides help clarify what is at stake in our 
attitudes toward school financing. To put it plainly, NCLB 
exposes the inevitable competition for achievement and funds 
among and within districts and states. A state's choice to adopt 
simpler or more elaborate assessments may stem from many 
considerations: costs; reputation outside the state; and, within 
the state, more concentrated lobbying efforts and more specific 
political repercussions from public reporting of which schools 
and students have achieved what levels of mastery. 
NCLB's remedies and sanctions are essentially 
entitlements to compensate students in failing schools, putting 
states under further pressure to avoid liability. Districts across 
84. See id. ~~ 140- 43. 
85. Cf. Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 
50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1212 (1997) ("If Congress must pay for sta te or local compliance 
with federal law, the citizens of states with lower compliance costs will subsidize 
compliance by states with higher costs."). 
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the nation report cutting back on non-essential programs, 
including arts, physical education, and academically 
challenging elective courses. In many cases, they attribute this 
to the costs of complying with NCLB.86 While the complaint of 
diluted curriculum is a valid and important education policy 
concern, it also reveals that school districts are "diverting ... 
funds from other important educational programs and 
priorities" in order to teach basic academic skills tested under 
NCLB. 87 To the extent that is true, NCLB is indirectly 
effectuating a redistribution of school financing that has eluded 
decades of other efforts. 88 
The redistributive effects of promoting equality should come 
as no surprise. The Sixteenth Amendment provides that 
federally collected income taxes require no apportionment in 
federal spending among the states89 and was enacted (in 1913, 
paradoxically, like NCLB, at the height of an era of restricted 
federal power) to expand the power of the federal 
government. 90 
Even if Connecticut's education policy is better than 
NCLB's, that does not make it the more appropriate policy for 
Connecticut. Connecticut's policy preferences seek to maximize 
academic excellence, while NCLB's seek the more mundane 
(and historically elusive) goal of broadening basic academic 
achievement. 91 Neither goal excludes the other, although 
limitations of funds may require focusing on one or the other at 
a given time. Coming three decades after San Antonio, NCLB 
is an entirely fair swing of the pendulum. 
The charge that NCLB is shortsighted is therefore a matter 
of perspective. NCLB's priorities are democratizing and take a 
long view of achieving equality. Nevertheless, NCLB in no way 
impedes the continued supplemental funding of local education 
with local property taxes. It gives an incomplete and distorted 
86. See, e.g. , Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 259. 
87. Jd. (quoting the plaintiffs in the case and citing the Joint Appendix). 
88. For a discussion of some of the implications of this idea for school financing 
litigation, see WOOD, supra note 12, at 77- 78. 
89. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
90. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1209- 12, 1230. 
91. As a bald illustration of t his idea , when Connecticut chose to use an 
additional writing assessment to satisfy a "third academic indicator" required for 
reporting AYP under NCLB, see Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ~ 44, the DOE 
suggested using daily attendance records instead as a cost-saving measure, id. ~ 138. 
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picture to attribute reduction of academic enrichment 
programs to the costs of NCLB and not to local communities' 
fiscal priorities. 
III. NCLB AND CONDITIONAL SPENDING 
A. Congress's Spending Power 
1. Evolution and scope 
The Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to tax and spend for two main purposes: 
the "common defense" and the "general welfare."92 Since 1936, 
the Supreme Court has held that Congress' spending for the 
general welfare is not limited to its specifically enumerated 
powers under the Constitution. 93 
The ruling adopting this broad purpose for spending came 
in United States v. Butler, where the Court nevertheless struck 
down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1931 on the grounds 
that its tax subsidy for farmers who complied with the program 
by restricting their production "invade[d] the reserved rights of 
the states" and was "a statutory plan to regulate and control" 
matters of state law.94 Butler held that the Tenth Amendment 
barred federal taxation and spending with a "coercive purpose" 
to "purchase a compliance [from the states] which the Congress 
is powerless to command."95 The Court concluded that farmers 
were nominally but "not in fact" free to "refuse to comply" with 
the subsidy program, because "the price of such refusal [was] 
the loss of benefits," and non-participating farmers would be 
unable to compete on the market and risked "financial ruin."96 
The Court articulated broad warnings against the dangers of 
coercive spending: 
It does not help to declare that local conditions throughout 
the nation have created a situation of national concern; for 
92. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, 
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare 
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
93. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). 
94. Id. at 68. 
95. Id. at 70-71. 
96. Id. 
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this is but to say that whenever there is a widespread 
similarity of local conditions, Congress may ignore 
constitutional limitations upon its own powers and usurp 
those reserved to the states. If, in lieu of compulsory 
regulation of subjects within the states' reserved jurisdiction, 
which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and 
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, [the 
Taxing and Spending Clause] would become the instrument 
for total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to 
the individual states.97 
387 
Although the Butler Court removed virtually any restriction 
on "general welfare," it sought to disempower Congress by 
preempting justifications based on national crisis and by 
framing its analysis of federal spending in terms of potential 
end-runs around the Tenth Amendment. Still, the decision's 
focus on farmers suggested its real concern lay with free 
markets as much as with states' autonomy. 
In the year after Butler was decided, the Court was won 
over to the New Deal and, in Steward Machine Company v. 
Davis, refused to find coercive spending in the incentives 
provided by the Social Security Act for states to create 
unemployment funds. 98 Steward Machine's echo of Butler's 
language of "national concern" revealed the sea change in the 
Court's attitude toward the benign use of federal policy: 
The [unemployment] problem had become national in area 
and dimensions. There was need of help from the nation if the 
people were not to starve. It is too late today for the argument 
to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use 
of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and 
their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the 
promotion of the general welfare.99 
Steward Machine remarked that the difference between 
persuasion and compulsion was "a question of degree, at times, 
perhaps, of fact," 100 but the truth of that statement is called 
into question by the fact that the Court has not struck down an 
exercise of the spending power since Butler in 1936. The 
historical moment of the decision in Steward Machine seems to 
suggest rather that Congress's power of persuasion is a 
97. ld. at 74-75. 
98. 301 u.s. 548, 589 (1937). 
99. ld. at 586--87. 
100. Id. at 590. 
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question of balance between the states' political and financial 
leverage and national need. 
The Court most recently comprehensively considered the 
spending power in 1987. 101 South Dakota v. Dole upheld 
legislation requiring states to raise the minimum drinking age 
to 21 as a condition of receipt of federal funds for highway 
construction. 102 The Court set forth no new law, but drew on 
existing law to reiterate four "restrictions" on Congress's use of 
the spending power: (i) spending must be for the general 
welfare, (ii) conditions on states' receipt of funds must be 
unambiguous and (iii) related to a federal interest in a national 
project, and (iv) neither the spending nor the conditions may 
transgress any independent bar in another constitutional 
provision. 103 Dole reaffirmed the broad principle that 
"encouragement to state action . . . is a valid use of the 
spending power" 104 and Congress may "further broad policy 
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and 
administrative directives." 105 The Court noted, almost in 
passing, that placing conditions on receipt of Congress's 
funding runs a risk of unconstitutional coercion but rejected 
the argument that coercion was present in the case before it, 
reasoning that South Dakota stood to lose only 5 percent of its 
federal highway funding. 106 
2. The renewed threat from federalism 
Dissenting in Dole, Justice O'Connor argued that 
Congress's action was "an attempt to regulate the sale of 
liquor." 107 She further argued under the relatedness restriction 
that the condition imposed by Congress appeared to be 
motivated by a desire for highway safety unrelated to the 
federal interest in highway construction. 108 With these 
arguments, Justice O'Connor advocated passionately for a 
101. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
102. Id. at 206. 
103. Id. at 207-08. 
104. Id. at 212. 
105. Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of 
Burger, C.J.)). 
106. Id. at 211. 
107. Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
108. See id. at 218. 
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return to the analytical approach of Butler: 
The Butler Court saw the Agricultural Adjustment Act for 
what it was-an exercise of regulatory, not spending, 
power . ... 
. . . If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' 
notion of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast 
financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the 
Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to tear down 
the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become 
a parliament of the whole people .. . . "109 
389 
Justice O'Connor's position in Dole should be understood 
from the perspective of the federalism revolution that was to 
come from the Court in the 1990s, when it restricted Congress's 
powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments 
as limits against Congressional power, in some cases for the 
first time since the New Deal. 110 
Professor Chemerinsky believes the spending power has a 
unique role among the federal powers and finds a suggestion of 
its insulation from the federalism revolution in the fact that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored both the Dole decision and 
several of the later decisions curbing federal power.111 But that 
begs the question of whether it will be the sea change in the 
Court's attitude to federalism that largely determines the 
outcome of its next spending power case. 
Some scholars argue that the Court should place limits on 
109. ld. at 216-17 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)). 
llO. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (in creating a damages 
remedy against states in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Congress 
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and unconstitutionally 
abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers in creating a civil remedy for violent crimes motivated by gender 
in the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to limit states' power to burden 
the free exercise of religion in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) ; Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Congress did not have power to direct states to conduct 
background checks of prospective firearm purchasers in the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Congress exceeded its 
Commerce Clause power in criminalizing possession of firearms in vicinity of schools); 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Spending Clause power permits 
Congress to incentivize states' regulation of hazardous waste disposal, but Tenth 
Amendment prevents it from compelling such state regulation). 
lll. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 
95 (2001). 
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the spending power. 112 In their view, Congress uses its 
conditional spending, as Butler warned, to effect a dubious end-
run around the Constitution's restrictions. 113 On the other 
hand, the Sixteenth Amendment secures the federal 
government's power to achieve redistributive effects among the 
states, and its implications for federalism have not been fully 
appreciated. 114 It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these 
contrary arguments will shape the Court's views when it next 
hears a major spending power case. 115 That is all the more so, 
since the Court has backed off its federalism revolution 
considerably since the 1990s, and some decisions have newly 
reaffirmed the supremacy of federal law in regulating activities 
with little discernible interstate purpose or federal interest. 116 
B. NCLB's Basis Under the Spending Clause 
1. NCLB's § 7907(a) and the constitutional requirement of clear 
notice 
It is widely remarked that three of the four restrictions on 
the spending power discussed in Dole carry little real weight. 11 7 
As to one of those three (the relatedness requirement), Justice 
O'Connor showed how it could be applied with real weight in 
her dissent in Dole. As to the other two of these restrictions 
(the requirements to serve the general welfare and to respect 
112. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the 
Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever 
Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003). 
113. See Baker & Berman, supra note 112, at 499-503 (describing the "loophole" 
the spending power offers to Congress to "circumvent" and "to effectively overturn 
Supreme Court decisions that have restricted congressional power"). 
114. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1209 & n.337. 
115. Professor Adler suggests a constitutional amendment may be needed to 
change the scope of the spending power. I d. at 1209 n.334. 
116. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the application of the 
Controlled Substances Act to home growth of marijuana not intended for sale as valid 
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 
(2004) (upholding the Americans with Disabilities Act's creation of a damages remedy 
against states as valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power and valid abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Nev. Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same with respect to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act). For discussion, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause 
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 347-49 (2008). 
117. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 85, at 1204; Baker & Berman, supra note 112, at 
463- 66. 
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constitutional prohibitions), the Supreme Court itself has noted 
their lack of forcefulness. 118 
The fourth restriction, however-the unambiguo~s or clear 
notice requirement-has frequently been engaged by courts. 
The idea here is that only unambiguous conditions can "enable 
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the 
consequences of their participation." 119 The Supreme Court has 
explained the clear notice requirement by noting that 
conditional spending is "much in the nature of a contract." 120 
Typically, Congress agrees to provide funds in exchange for a 
state's agreement to further federal policy. The problem of 
unclear notice is especially acute in situations like that created 
by NCLB, "where Congress has intended the States to fund 
certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal 
funds ." 121 Fairness and the concept of contractual choice 
require states' knowing agreement to fund programs whose 
dimensions and costs cannot be foreseen and therefore cannot 
be confined to particular federal grants. The clear notice 
requirement is one of the major grounds of the litigation 
challenging NCLB. 
In Connecticut v. Spellings, Connecticut claimed that the 
DOE's denial of its waiver requests (or proposed plan 
amendments) required it to spend its own funds to comply with 
NCLB and that this violated § 7907(a), NCLB's so-called 
unfunded mandates provision. 122 Section 7907(a) states: 
118. The Court "questioned whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable 
restriction at all" and noted the "unexceptional proposition" of its interpretation of the 
independent constitutional bar restriction as applying not to "the indirect achievement 
of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly" but merely to 
"activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 207 n.2, 210 (1987) . 
119. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 17-18. 
122. See Connecticut v. Spellings (Connecticut II) , 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 177 (D. 
Conn. 2008). 
The term "unfunded mandate" grew out of the political movement to limit federal 
power in the 1980s and 1990s. See generally Adler, supra note 85. As applied to 
conditional spending measures (participation in which is by definition voluntary) , the 
term can be misleading. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (as codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S. C.) (UMA), defined the 
term "Federal intergovernmental mandate" to exclude "condition[s] of Federal 
assistance ." 2 U.S.C. § 658(5)(A)(i)(I), noted in Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267; cf. Adler, supra 
note 85. at 1204 ("Even if considered mandates rather than voluntarily assumed 
obligations, conditions of federal assistance are supported by independent legal 
authority under the Spending Clause."). 
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an officer 
or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or 
control a State, local educational agency, or school's 
curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or 
local resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof 
to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this 
Act.I23 
Connecticut claimed that § 7907(a) relieved it of having to 
spend its own funds beyond those provided by Congress to 
comply with NCLB's requirements. 124 The district court did not 
reach the § 7907(a) issue, but ruled that Connecticut's failure 
to raise the dispute with the DOE prevented jurisdiction. 125 
School District of Pontiac u. Secretary of the United States 
Department of Education made explicit the connection between 
the § 7907(a) issue and the clear notice requirement of 
Spending Clause law. 126 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reached the constitutional question of whether, in light 
of the allegedly contradictory language of § 7907(a) , NCLB 
provided clear notice to states of their obligations to spend 
their own funds to comply with the law as a condition of 
receiving federal funds. 127 The plaintiffs argued (as in 
Connecticut) that § 7907(a) means states need only comply with 
the requirements of NCLB to the extent that federal funds are 
made available to pay for them. 128 The Bush administration 
argued that § 7907(a) merely prohibits federal officials from 
imposing additional requirements beyond those specified in 
NCLB, and that states participating in NCLB must comply 
with all its requirements, "even if they must spend non-federal 
funds to do so." 129 
The Sixth Circuit held in a 2-1 decision that the law did not 
provide clear notice, although that panel ruling is now vacated 
Section 7907(a) may signal Congress's intention to comply with UMA. It may just as 
well, however, suggest inattention or avoidance. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267 (§ 7907(a) 
was borrowed wholesale from a 1988 education law that predated UMA); id. at 268 
("NCLB makes no reference to the UMA's definition of 'mandate' .... "). It is probably 
futile to seek to resolve the contradictions inherent in the language and purpose of 
§ 7907(a). 
123. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2006). 
124. Connecticut II, 549 F . Supp. 2d at 177. 
125. ld. at 180-81. 
126. Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 254. 
127. Id. 
128. ld. at 256-57. 
129. Id. at 265, 260. 
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and the Court of Appeals heard reargument en bane in 
December, 2008.130 The vacated decision concluded that, 
although NCLB is unambiguous in stating the requirements 
that are conditions of states' receiving federal funds, § 7907(a) 
makes it unclear whether states must spend their own funds to 
meet those requirements. 131 If that view prevails on rehearing, 
the DOE would be legally unable to enforce penalties for non-
compliance based on insufficiency of federal funds (at least in 
the Sixth Circuit). It would also seriously weaken the DOE's 
leverage, and it would possibly mean that the remedies NCLB 
makes available to students in deficient schools such as free 
tutoring and transfer options would become, for most practical 
purposes, unenforceable. 132 On the other hand, the victory 
would be a narrow one, since the ruling would not carry the 
penetrating force of a finding of coercion. That is, following a 
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality under the clear 
notice restriction of the Spending Clause, Congress would be 
able to repair the defects caused by the language of § 7907(a) 
fairly easily, if it chose to do so. 133 
Pontiac's clear notice litigation seems like a temporary 
distraction from the more profound issues of federalism raised 
by NCLB. 134 It may effectively highlight the political 
dimensions of the federalism debate-for example, by 
demonstrating the haste under which Congress may have acted 
to pass NCLB or the pressure on states to rise to the challenges 
and ideals the law poses. It does not, however, provide the 
basis for a ruling on the fundamental legal question of whether 
NCLB crosses the absolute (and, since 1937, theoretical) 
130. Pontiac, 512 F .3d 252; Walsh, supra note 21. No decision has been issued as of 
this writing (J anuary 2009). 
13 1. Pontiac, 512 F .3d at 269 . 
1:32. S ee Al exa ndra Villarrea l O'Rourke, Note, Picking Up the Pieces After PIGS: 
Evaluating Current Efforts To Narrow the Educat ion Gap, 11 H ARV. LA'l'JNO L. R EV. 
26:3 , 274 (2008) . 
133. S ee Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 272 ("(T]he ball is proper ly left in [Congress's] court 
. .. . "). 
134. ld. a t 267 ("Plaint iffs ' content ion is not that NCLB as a whole i s an unfunded 
mandate forced upon the States; they appear willing to concede tha t it is a volunta ry 
program .... "); cf. id. a t 264 ("Indeed, perha ps the Secreta ry's view of the text is 
ultimately cor rect. But the only relevant question h ere is wheth er the Act provides 
clear notice to the States of their obligation ."); but see Bagenstos, supra note 116, at 
393- 409 (a rguing that the Supreme Court is likely to invoke the clear notice 
requirement increasingly in the future as an indirect limitation on Congress's spending 
power). 
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constitutional line of coercion. 135 
2. The coercion claim and pre-enforcement declaratory 
judgment 
[2009 
The fundamental constitutional question is whether 
(assuming clear notice) NCLB represents a coercive attempt to 
impose federal education policy on the states. There are a 
number of considerations that make bringing such a claim 
impractical, as, agam, Connecticut's expenence helps 
illustrate. 
First, without exercising its right to opt out of NCLB, any 
state challenging the law on the grounds of coercion would, like 
Connecticut before it, be bringing a pre-enforcement claim 
unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss. Connecticut's facial 
challenge to NCLB was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the penalty to be applied for 
non-compliance was hypothetical as well as indeterminate. 136 
The district court noted that Connecticut was in full 
compliance with the law, and, because any eventual penalty 
would be subject to the DOE's discretion, the court would not 
rely on speculation based on the DOE's responses to other 
states' inquiries about the consequences of non-compliance. 137 
Despite studies commissioned by state legislatures of the 
consequences of opting out of NCLB, no state has in fact opted 
out. 
Second, courts have regularly found the coercion test, which 
requires an inquiry into states' financial capabilities, to be both 
"unworkable" in practice 138 and a political question 
inappropriate for judicial resolution. 139 Total federal financial 
135. In any case, the dissenting judge in the vacated Pontiac ruling argued 
forcefully that the misleading language of § 7907(a) is a negligible aberration in an 
otherwise coherent and comprehensive statutory scheme consistent with historical 
practice. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 277 (McKeague, J., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs' 
interpretation of the NCLB not only disregards its overall statutory scheme, but it also 
defies reason and history."). That view likely motivated the judges' vote to rehear the 
case en bane. 
136. See Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 491-94. 
137. See id. at 494, 494 n.20; Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, ,1~ 66-69. 
138. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 1988)). 
139. See, e.g., id. at 448 ("The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial 
judgments regarding a state's financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly 
suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state governments."; 
"The purpose of the coercion test is to protect state sovereignty from federal incursions. 
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support of state programs is so extensive that it is difficult to 
make an effective claim of coercion based on the withholding of 
only one among many types of funding. 140 
Third, an ultimate finding of coercion in NCLB's conditions 
is far from assured. Federal funding constitutes approximately 
7 or 8 percent of total education spending. 141 Connecticut 
estimated that if the DOE were to withhold all of its Title I 
funding, as well as other portions of its education funding, it 
stood to lose "up to 5%" of its total education budget. 142 These 
percentage figures , viewed from the perspective of case law 
(including Dole, where 5 percent of highway funds were at 
stake), strongly suggest that no finding of coercion in NCLB 
can be sustained without an about-face on spending power law 
from the Supreme Court. 143 
On the other hand, to the extent that a finding of coercion 
rests on the facts of a case (as Steward Machine maintained), 
the application of NCLB presents a fairly convincing set of 
facts. 144 States relied on ESEA funds for nearly 40 years with 
few strings attached and the addition of substantial new 
requirements placed as conditions on continued receipt of those 
very funds can be seen as coercive. 145 Even if those funds 
represent only 5-8 percent of a state's education spending, in 
Connecticut that amounted to approximately $300 million 
annually-not an insignificant amount. 146 A state choosing to 
opt out of NCLB would, in effect, be forfeiting its share of 
federal funds raised through federal taxation of its citizens; it 
If this sovereignty is adequately protected by the national political process, we do not 
see any reason for asking the judiciary to settle questions of policy and politics that 
range beyond its normal expertise."); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 111, at 102-03. 
140. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1256 ("Given the complex interrelationship of 
federal tax, spending, and regulatory policies, it is impossible for federal courts, bound 
by the narrow constraints of party-defined litigation, to assess the fiscal burdens of 
individual federal programs in the proper context .... The fact that states and cities 
remain net fiscal beneficiaries of intergovernmental programs suggests that lower 
levels of government do receive adequate protection and representation in this 
manner."). 
141. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
142. Connecticut I, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 493. 
143. Since Dole, courts have upheld spending conditions where much more than 5 
percent of a state's funds were at stake. In Skinner, for example, the Ninth Circuit 
found no coercion, although 95 percent of Nevada's highway funds were to be withheld 
if it did not adopt the national speed limit. 884 F.2d at 446. 
144. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
145. See Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267 n.4; Bump, supra note 11, at 548, 551. 
146. See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 16, '11'11 63, 65, 67-69. 
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would face the politically infeasible task of raising state taxes 
to compensate for the forfeited federal tax funding. 147 
And yet 5 percent is only 5 percent. What this analysis of 
the strongest case of coercion on the facts of NCLB suggests 
more than anything else is that the ultimate outcome of a 
coercion suit would rest principally (as the historical context of 
Steward Machine, rather than its dictum, suggests) on the 
Supreme Court's attitude toward national imperatives and 
state autonomy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This comment has argued that a sound education policy 
cannot exist without uniform standards and transparent 
accountability. It has also argued that historical forces and 
socio-economic realities make a federal role in education 
necessary to achieve equal opportunity. Such a federal role is 
appropriate from the viewpoint of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and so is the resulting financial burden on states. Because local 
school districts retain the prerogative of supplementing state 
and federal funding of education with local property taxes, the 
charge that NCLB dilutes their curriculum is unconvincing. 
If NCLB has diluted or qualified state control of education, 
it has also provided considerable new funding and carefully 
preserved states' choices in education policy. Weighing the 
proportionality of these factors is a difficult, perhaps 
impossible endeavor. Unless the full panel of Sixth Circuit 
appellate judges unexpectedly reverses the district court's 
holding in Pontiac, NCLB litigation appears to have been 
futile. States should therefore reconcile themselves to NCLB's 
requirements, and Congress should work with them to 
reauthorize an improved version that moves beyond standards 
to encompass teaching reform as well. 
Without a sustained effort to build on the foundation of an 
adequate education, NCLB will lose the high ground it has 
claimed. Initiatives to reform curriculum and teacher 
preparation will be much more expensive and difficult to 
implement than NCLB's current provisions. Congress, too, 
must put its money where its mouth is. 
147. See Baker, supra note 112, at 1937, 1937 n.134; Brian Galle, Getting 
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About 
Conditional Grants of Federal Funds , 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (2004) . 
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Congress' power of conditional spending to address national 
problems is an enormously effective tool of federal power over 
the states. Just as importantly, though, federal conditional 
spending also provides an ideal forum for state and federal 
cooperation. When Congress spends in an area like education, 
over which it has no direct constitutional power, it is most 
dependent on the states' assent, and the states' leverage over 
Congress is at its maximum. 148 Similarly, negotiation between 
states and federal agencies is superior to the theoretical 
concept of clear notice in unambiguous legislation. 149 
The Bush administration, tardily but with laudable 
responsiveness, showed a greater willingness in its final year to 
negotiate and to cooperate with states. 150 The lllth Congress 
and the Obama administration DOE should move in the same 
direction but guard carefully against the dangers of 
perfunctorily increasing the use of waivers, watering down 
NCLB's accountability measures, and increasing funding 
without expanding NCLB's education goals. It would be a 
shame if the most pervasive equality measure in decades were 
to lapse or waste into inconsequentiality before it is fully 
recognized for what it is. Despite the San Antonio Court's 
formulation, 151 education is generative of all our freedoms. 
Anthony Consiglio* 
148. See Adler, supra note 85, at 1237; David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of 
the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 500-1 (2007); Galle , supra note 147, 
at 188--89. 
149. See Galle, supra note 147, at 181-83. 
150. For example, the Bush administration DOE permitted six states to participate 
in a pilot program to experiment with a more flexible classification of deficient schools 
and a more flexible application of sanctions, so that states might focus their resources 
on their more poorly performing schools. See Laura Diamond, Feds: Tutor Kids Early, 
ATLANTAJ.-CONST., July 2, 2008, at Bl. 
151. See supra notes 29- 30 and accompanying text. 
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footnotes) , I have drawn on ten years of experience as an English teacher in public high 
schools in New York and Connecticut. I dedicate this comment to (who else?) two of my 
teachers: Katherine Callen King, whose activism and passion for social justice were my 
first introduction to the noble achievement and arduous challenge of expanding access 
to a quality education; and Nelson Tebbe, whose courageous teaching led me to think I 
could wrestle some truth out of that ferocious and graceful American Proteus, the 
Tenth Amendment. The conclusions reached here are carefully considered rather than 
resolute; an open and searching mind is what I ask of myself and my readers. 
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